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The autobiographical IAT (aIAT) is an implicit behavioral instrument that can detect
autobiographical memories encoded in an individual’s mind by measuring how quickly
this person can categorize and associate sentences related to a specific event with the
logical dimensions true and false. Faster categorization when an event (e.g., I went to
Paris) is associated with the dimension true than false indicates that that specific event
is encoded as true in the individual’s mind. The aim of this study is to investigate the
electrophysiological correlates of the aIAT, used as a memory-detection technique (i.e.,
to identify which of two events is true). To this end, we recorded ERPs while participants
performed an aIAT assessing which of two playing cards they had previously selected.We
found an increased N200 and a decreased LPC (or P300) at the fronto-central sites when
participants associated the selected playing card with the dimension false than true.
Notably, both components have been previously and consistently reported in studies
investigating deception. These results suggest that associating a true autobiographical
event with the concept of false may involve the same cognitive processes associated
with deception.
Keywords: autobiographical memory, aIAT, deception, N200, LPC
INTRODUCTION
Deception can be defined as a deliberative attempt of a person to create in another a belief which
he/she considers to be untrue (Vrij, 2001).
Given its obvious relevance in several settings (e.g., in the forensic setting; Meijer et al., 2010),
the study of deception has raised considerable interest among researchers and many studies sought
to investigate its underlying cognitive processes bymeans ofmodern brain imaging techniques such
as functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and Event Related Potentials (ERPs; Langleben
et al., 2002, 2005; Ganis et al., 2003, 2011; Johnson et al., 2003; Spence et al., 2004; Sokolovsky et al.,
2011; Hu and Rosenfeld, 2012). For example, fMRI studies showed that the patterns of activations
associated with deception involve predominantly frontal areas, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which also have a role in the inhibition
and control of automatic responses (Sip et al., 2008). Consistently with these results, ERP studies
(Rosenfeld et al., 1998; Tardif et al., 2000; Soskins et al., 2001; Miller et al., 2002; Johnson et al.,
2003, 2008) showed that the recognition of deceptive behaviors elicits two electrophysiological
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components typically associated with conflicting responses: the
N200 and the LPC (or also known as P300). The N200 is
a negative-going component that occurs around 200–350ms
post-stimulus and is thought to be related to conflict detection
(Van Veen and Carter, 2002; Folstein and Van Petten, 2008). The
LPC is a positive wave that starts around 300ms after stimulus
onset and reflects increased cognitive load (Isreal et al., 1980a,b;
Wickens et al., 1983; Kramer et al., 1985). For example, Hu
et al. (2011) investigated deception by means of a Differentiation
of Deception Paradigm (DDP; Furedy et al., 1988), in which
participants answered the same questions about self- and other-
related information twice, once truthfully and once deceptively.
In this paradigm, honest and deceptive responses occurred in
equal proportion for participants (i.e., 50–50%). The authors
found that lying was associated with a decreased LPC (or also
known as P300) and an increased N200 in the fronto-central
area. Similarly Suchotzki et al. (2015), used a Sheffield Lie Test
(a modified version of the DDP) in which participants were
presented with the same set of questions (i.e., mock-crime and
control questions): in half of the trials they were instructed to
give honest responses while in the other half to give deceptive
responses. They found a decreased LPC and an enhanced N200
over fronto-central electrodes for deceptive responses compared
to honest responses.
Taken together, these findings suggest that lying elicits
cognitive processes associated with the inhibition of an automatic
response (i.e., the truth) and an increase in cognitive load needed
to generate an alternative response (i.e., the deception; Spence
et al., 2001).
We recently proposed a novel paradigm relying on reaction
times (RTs) that might be used to investigate deception: the
autobiographical IAT (aIAT; Sartori et al., 2008). The aIAT is
a variant of the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al.,
1998; Nosek et al., 2007) that assesses whether a specific
autobiographical event is encoded as true or false in the
respondent’s memory by measuring how quickly a person can
categorize and associate sentences related to an autobiographical
event with the logical dimensions true and false. For example,
in a typical aIAT assessing whether a given person has spent
his/her last summer to Paris or to London, participants are
asked to classify sentences representing the four categories—
Paris, London, true, and false—by pressing one of two keys in
two different response conditions. In one condition, participants
categorize sentences related to Paris and to the dimension true
with one response key, while categorizing sentences related to
London and to the dimension false by using another response
key. In the other condition, participants categorize the same
sentences but with a different key configuration: this time one
response key is used to categorize sentences related to Paris and
to the dimension false, while the other response key is used to
categorize sentences related to London and to the dimension
true. The difference in average categorization latency between the
two conditions is an indicator of association strengths between
the autobiographical event (Paris or London) and the logical
categories (true and false). For example, faster categorization
when sentences related to Paris are associated with the dimension
true (and sentences related to London to the dimension false)
compared to the reverse indicates an implicit association of the
logical dimension true with Paris compared to London. This
result is usually interpreted as recognition of the event “I went
to Paris” over “I went to London” as true.
The aIAT has demonstrated high accuracy and validity in
several settings (Sartori et al., 2007, 2008; Marini et al., 2012;
Agosta and Sartori, 2013), as well as its resistance to faking.
Indeed, although studies showed that the aIAT can be faked when
examinees are given specific instruction or previous training
(Verschuere et al., 2009; Hu et al., 2012, 2015), recent research
(Agosta et al., 2011) demonstrated that it is possible to identify
successfully fakers on the basis of specific response patterns.
Indeed, participants who try to fake the aIAT show different
latencies in the test and practice blocks. That is, they are
abnormally slow in the test blocks compared to the practice
blocks of the aIAT.
The goal of the present study was to investigate the
electrophysiological correlates of the aIAT used as a memory-
detection technique. In particular, our working hypothesis was
that the incongruent condition of the aIAT would elicit the
same electrophysiological correlates associated with conflicting
responses observed in studies investigating deception (i.e., LPC
and N200).
Indeed, similar to lying, the incongruent condition of the
aIAT, requires the inhibition of an automatic response (i.e.,
classify stimuli with a response configuration that is congruent
with the true autobiographic event encoded in their memory:
true event with the dimension true) and select a response
which is in conflict with it (i.e., classify stimuli with a response
configuration that is incongruent with the true autobiographic
event encoded in their memory: true event with the dimension
false).
In order to test our hypothesis, we recorded ERPs
while participants performed an aIAT assessing which of
two playing cards (e.g., 4 of diamonds and 7 of clubs)
they had previously selected. We then compared the
amplitudes of the LPC and N200 over the fronto-central
electrodes recorded during the incongruent and congruent
conditions.
METHODS
Participants
Thirty-eight undergraduate students (29 women and 9men;
19–31 years) in Psychology at University of Padua volunteered to
take part in the experiment. All participants reviewed and signed
an informed consent form in which the overall design of the
study, risks, and the voluntary nature of participating in the study
were explained. The study was approved by Ethics Committee of
the Department of General Psychology of University of Padua.
Materials and Procedure
Before aIAT administration, participants were asked to select
one of two covered playing cards, memorize it, and perform a
consolidation task. In order to control the selected playing card,
we randomly assigned participants to two groups. In the 4 of
diamonds group, both covered playing cards were 4 of diamonds.
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In the 7 of clubs group, both covered playing cards were 7 of
clubs. Of the 38 participants, 19 were assigned to 4 of diamonds
group and 19 to 7 of clubs group.
In each trial of the consolidation task, one of eight different
playing cards (e.g., 4 of diamonds, 7 of clubs, 3 of hearts,
3 of diamonds) was presented in the center of the screen.
Participants were asked to press the space bar every time
they saw the playing card that they previously selected. Each
card was presented 5 times, for a total of 40 trials. Error
feedback was presented for 400ms if participants responded
incorrectly.
In the aIAT, participants were asked to classify 10 sentences
belonging to the logical dimensions true/false and 10 sentences
referring to the 4 of diamonds or 7 of clubs playing cards
(Table 1). Sentences belonging to the dimension true or false
were composed of four words. Sentences referring to the 4 of
diamonds or 7 of clubs were composed of three words followed
by a picture representing one of the two playing cards.
The aIAT consisted of a total of five blocks (Sartori et al., 2008)
schematically shown in Figure 1. In Block 1 (20 trials; logical
discrimination) participants classified sentences as true or false.
They were asked to press the A key if the sentence was true for
them (e.g., I am in a laboratory) and the L key if the factual
sentence was false for them (e.g., I am in a theater).
In Block 2 (20 trials; playing card discrimination), participants
categorized statements relative to 4 of diamonds or 7 of clubs.
They pressed the A button to classify the sentences related to 4
of diamonds (e.g., I picked the 4 of diamond) and L button to
classify the sentences referred to7 of clubs (e.g., I picked the 7
of clubs).
In Block 3 (60 trials; double categorization), participants
categorized statements belonging either to the true/false
dimension or 4 of diamonds/7 of clubs. They were asked to
press the A key to classify sentences referring to 4 of diamonds
and the dimension true, whereas the L key was used to classify
sentences referring to the 7 of clubs and the dimension false. For
participants in the 4 of diamonds group this was the congruent
block, while for participants in the 7 of clubs group this was the
incongruent block.
In Block 4 (40 trials; reversed playing card discrimination),
participants classified only statements referring to 4 of diamonds
or 7 of clubs as in Block 2 but using a different key configuration.
They were asked to press the A key for the sentences related to 7
of clubs (7 of clubs category) and the L key for sentences related
to 4 of diamonds (4 of diamonds category).
In Block 5 (60 trials; reversed double categorization),
participants classified statements referring both the true/false
dimension and 4 of diamonds/7 of clubs as in Block 3, but in
this condition they pressed the A key for true statements and
the sentences related to 7 of clubs, the L key for false statements
and sentences related to 4 of diamonds1. Thus, for participants
in the 4 of diamonds group this block was incongruent, while for
participants in the 7 of clubs group this block was congruent.
Reminder labels in the form of category names (i.e., true, false,
4 of diamonds and 7 of clubs) remained on the monitor for the
entire duration of each block. An error signal appeared after an
incorrect response.
1In each group, half of the participants administered the blocks in the order just
outlined, whereas for the other half, the order of blocks 3 and 5 was reversed as
well the order of blocks 2 and 4.
TABLE 1 | List of sentences used in the experiment for the four categories.
Italian English translation
STIMULI
True 1. Ho davanti un computer.
2. Sto facendo un esperimento.
3. Sono in un laboratorio.
4. Sto usando una tastiera.
5. Mi trovo a Padova.
1. I am in front of a computer.
2. I am doing an experiment.
3. I am in a laboratory.
4. I am using a keyboard.
5. I am in Padua.
False 1. Ho davanti una televisione.
2. Sto facendo un gioco.
3. Sono in un cinema.
4. Sto usando una matita.
5. Mi trovo a Milano.
1. I am in front of a television.
2. I am doing a game.
3. I am in a cinema.
4. I am using a pencil.
5. I am in Milan.
4 of diamonds 1. Ho visto la carta (4 of diamonds picture).
2. Ho girato la carta (4 of diamonds picture).
3. Ho pescato la carta (4 of diamonds picture).
4. Ho selezionato la carta (4 of diamonds picture).
5. Ho preso la carta (4 of diamonds picture).
1. I saw the (4 of diamonds picture).
2. I turned the (4 of diamonds picture).
3. I picked the (4 of diamonds picture).
4. I cut the (4 of diamonds picture).
5. I took the (4 of diamonds picture).
7 of clubs 1. Ho visto la carta (7 of clubs picture).
2. Ho girato la carta (7 of clubs picture).
3. Ho pescato la carta (7 of clubs picture).
4. Ho selezionato la carta (7 of clubs picture).
5. Ho preso la carta (7 of clubs picture).
1. I saw the (7 of clubs picture).
2. I turned the (7 of clubs picture).
3. I picked the (7 of clubs picture).
4. I cut the (7 of clubs picture).
5. I took the (7 of clubs picture).
The Table shows the Italian sentence and the corresponding English translation.
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the experimental procedure in the consolidation task and aIAT.
EEG/ERP Recording
Scalp voltages were recorded using a 64-channel electro-cap with
Ag/AgCl electrodes. A frontal electrode (AFz) was connected
to the ground. During recording, all electrodes were referenced
to Cz. Vertical and horizontal eye movements were recorded.
Electrode impedance was kept under 5 k for all recordings.
The EEG was recorded continuously and digitized at a sampling
rate of 500Hz. The signal was off- line filtered using a low-
pass filter with cut-off frequency of 30Hz and 24 dB/octave
attenuation. Ocular movement artifacts were corrected using the
algorithm provided by the Neuroscan 4.3 software. The EEG was
segmented into epochs starting 100ms before presentation of
the target word and lasting 1500ms after its onset. The epochs
were aligned to the 200-ms baseline before onset of the target
word presentation. Trials contaminated by movement artifacts
(peak-to-peak deflection over±75µV) were rejected.
RESULTS
Behavioral Data
In the present experiment, we considered three dependent
variables: D index (Greenwald et al., 2003), mean RTs and percent
accuracy (PA) in the two combined categorization blocks (blocks
3 and 5). Responses faster than 150ms or slower than 10,000ms
were removed. Following Greenwald et al. (2003), we computed
the D index for each participant by dividing the difference in
mean response latency between the two aIAT combined blocks
by the participant’s latency standard deviation inclusive of the
two combined blocks. Errors were replaced with the mean of
the correct responses in that response block plus a 600ms of
penalty (Greenwald et al., 2003). A positive D index indicated a
stronger association of 4 of diamonds card with true and 7 of clubs
card with false, whereas a negative D index indicated a stronger
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association of 4 of diamonds card with false and 7 of clubs card
with true.
We analyzed participants’ behavioral data by means of three
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) on average RTs, PA, and D
index. RTs and PA were submitted to ANOVA with congruency
(congruent vs. incongruent) as a within subject factor and group
(4 of diamonds and 7 of clubs) as a between subject factor. D
index was submitted to an ANOVA with group (4 of diamonds
and 7 of clubs) as a between subject factor.
In agreement with previous results (Sartori et al., 2008; Agosta
and Sartori, 2013), faster RTs and higher PA were found in
the congruent than in the incongruent condition [RTs: 621 vs.
773ms, F(1, 37) = 28.22, p < 0.01, η
2
p = 0.43; PA: 0.97 vs.
0.94; F(1, 37) = 16.66, p < 0.01, η
2
p = 0.31]. Similarly, a
significant difference in the D indexes was found between groups
[F(1, 36) = 46.98, p < 0.01, η
2
p = 0.57]. That is, the D index
was positive for the 4 of diamonds group and negative for the 7
of clubs group (0.55 vs. −0.37). This pattern of results indicated
that the aIAT accurately detected which playing card participants
had selected. Indeed, faster RTs were found when the playing
card that participants selected was associated with the dimension
true (congruent condition) and slower when it was instead
associated with dimension false (incongruent condition). The D
index accurately classified 34 out of 38 participants. Eight of
these 34 participants showedD values ranging in the inconclusive
window (−0.2,+0.2) identified by Agosta and Sartori (2013). The
accuracy of the aIAT was confirmed by an ROC analysis (area
under the curve, AUC= 0.93).
Electrophysiological Data
We next investigated the electrophysiological correlates of the
aIAT by analyzing ERP responses. In this analysis, we excluded
(1) participants who showed no stronger association between the
selected card and the dimension true (i.e., participants for whom
the D index calculated from aIAT performance did not detect
accurately which playing card they had previously selected),
(2) data of subjects who showed excessive movement artifacts
or bad electrodes impendence (5% of the trials), and (3) trials
of the aIAT in which participants were not accurate (4.5% of
the trials). Finally, for each subject, we separately averaged the
ERPs recorded during the congruent and incongruent blocks
respectively. The data of 31 participants were included in our
analysis.
Visual inspection of the ERPs indicated two different
components localized at the fronto-central electrodes (FC3, FC1,
FCz, FC2, FC4): the N200 and the LPC (see Figure 2). Both
components were measured from target stimulus onset both
in the congruent and incongruent condition. The N200 was
quantified as the average amplitude between 250 and 350ms,
whereas the LPC was determined as the mean voltage between
350 and 650ms. To investigate the lateralization of these two ERP
components, we calculated the mean amplitude of the fronto-
central electrophysiological activity for electrodes covering the
left (i.e., FC3 and FC1) and right (i.e., FC2 and FC4) anterior
scalp regions for each participant and for each condition.
N200 and LPC mean amplitudes were separately submitted
to an ANOVA with congruency (congruent vs. incongruent)
and localization (left vs. center vs. right) as within subject
factors. All p-values were corrected for violations of the sphericity
assumption using the method of Greenhouse and Geisser
(Greenhouse and Geisser, 1959; Picton et al., 2000).
N200
We found a significant main effect of congruency, F(1, 30) =
6.52, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.18, indicating a greater negativity for
the incongruent than congruent condition (−1.60 vs. −1.13).
Localization was also significant, F(2, 60) = 10.28, p < 0.01, η
2
p =
0.25. Bonferroni pairwise comparisons showed that the N200
amplitudes were more negative in the left and central electrodes
compared to the right electrodes (−1.74 and −1.45 vs. −0.90,
p < 0.01). The interaction between congruency and localization
did not reach significance, F(2, 60) = 0.51, p = 0.52, η
2
p = 0.02,
indicating that the difference between the N200 amplitudes in
the congruent and incongruent conditions was not modulated by
localization.
LPC
The main factor of congruency was significant, F(1, 30) = 14.35,
p < 0.01, η2p = 0.32. More specifically the LPC amplitudes
were smaller in the incongruent than congruent condition (0.26
vs. 0.86). We also found a significant effect of the localization
factor, F(2, 60) = 7.03, p < 0.01, η
2
p = 0.19. A closer inspection
revealed that the LPC amplitudes were more positive in the
central and right electrodes compared to the left electrodes (0.73
and 0.85 vs. 0.10, p < 0.10). However, as in the case of the
N200, the localization did not explain the difference between the
LPC amplitudes in the congruent and incongruent conditions.
Indeed, we found no significant effect of the interaction between
congruency and localization factors, F(2, 60) = 1.64, p = 0.21,
η
2
p = 0.05.
This pattern of results for the N200 and LPC was confirmed
by a Spatial-Temporal Principal Component Analysis (ST-PCA;
see Supplementary Materials).
Correlation analysis between the N200 and LPC amplitudes
in the congruent and incongruent conditions by location showed
that these two ERP components were positively correlated.
That is, larger differences between the N200 amplitudes in the
congruent and incongruent conditions were associated with
larger differences in the LPC (left: 0.56, p < 0.001; center: r =
0.66, p < 0.001; right: r = 0.68, p < 0.001).
Taken together these results indicated that when participants
associated the playing card that they selected with the dimension
false (i.e., incongruent condition), both the N200 and LPC
components elicited a negative pattern. Specifically, we observed
an increase of the negativity of the N200 and a reduction of the
positive deflection of the LPC in fronto-central electrodes.
DISCUSSION
The present study aimed at investigating the electrophysiological
correlates of the aIAT used as a memory-detection technique.
To this end, participants were first required to pick a card.
They, then, underwent an aIAT in which we tested the strength
of association between the card they had selected with the
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FIGURE 2 | The N200 and LPC in the fronto-central electrodes (FC3, FC1, FCZ, FC2, and FC4). The N200 was larger for the incongruent than congruent
condition, while the LPC was smaller for the incongruent than congruent condition.
concept of true (congruent condition) or false (incongruent
condition) while measuring ERPs from scalp electrodes. Our
working hypothesis was that performance of the incongruent
condition of the aIAT would elicit electrophysiological responses
found in previous studies investigating deception: the N200 and
the LPC. Consistently with our hypothesis we found a decreased
LPC and an increased N200 in the incongruent condition of
the aIAT.
ERP Results
In our experiments, the performance of the incongruent
condition of the aIAT produced an increase of the N200 and a
decrease of the LPC in the fronto-central region. Several studies
support the association between these two components and
deception.
Specifically, the LPC component has been consistently
reported in many earlier studies and is considered a good
indicator of deception (Rosenfeld et al., 1998; Tardif et al., 2000;
Soskins et al., 2001; Miller et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2003, 2008).
For example, Johnson et al. (2003, 2008) reported that deceptive
responses, conflicting with the truth, produced a reduced LPC
amplitude. More recent studies, have found that deception elicits
a more complex pattern of ERPs responses that involves not
only the LPC but also the N200. In particular, studies using
paradigms with an equal proportions of deceptive and honest
responses showed, in addition to a reduced LPC, also a decreased
N200 for lying than truth telling (Hu et al., 2011; Suchotzki
et al., 2015). Interestingly, in the aIAT, similarly to paradigms
used in more recent deception studies, participants had to
associate, in different blocks, the same stimuli (i.e., sentences
describing an autobiographical event) with the concepts of true
and false. Taken together, our results show that, in agreement
with our hypothesis, the incongruent block of the aIAT produces
similar electrophysiological responses typically associated with
deception.
The similarity between the electrophysiological responses
associated with deceptive behaviors and the incongruent
condition of the aIAT suggests that lying and associating a true
event with the concept of false may reflect analogous cognitive
processes. Indeed, during both deception and the incongruent
block of the aIAT, the cognitive system needs to activate control
processes in order (1) to inhibit a pre-potent response (i.e., to
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tell the truth in the case of deception and to associate a true
autobiographical event with the concept of true in the case of
the incongruent condition of the aIAT) and (2) to emit an
alternative response (i.e., to lie in the case of deception and
to associate a true autobiographical event with the concept of
false in the case of the incongruent condition of the aIAT).
The activation of such control processes is reflected in the
pattern of ERPs responses that we reported here. Indeed, previous
studies have consistently shown that the LPC and N200 are
two ERP components reflecting a collection of cognitive control
processes, such as response inhibition, detection of response
conflict, and strategic performance monitoring (West, 2003;
Folstein and Van Petten, 2008; Chen and Melara, 2009; Larson
et al., 2009; Coderre et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2013). Specifically,
a decreased LPC has been found in association with an increase
of the cognitive load requested in a task (Magliero et al., 1984;
Doucet and Stelmack, 1999). Similarly, an increase of the N200
over fronto-central scalp areas has been consistently reported in
studies involving response inhibition (e.g., using the Go/Nogo
task, Bokura et al., 2001; the Eriksen Flanker task, Bartholow
et al., 2005; and the Stop Signal Paradigm, Schmajuk et al.,
2006).
Note that whereas we and other previous studies found that
the recognition of deception is associated with a decreased
LPC, ERPs studies using the Concealed Information Test (CIT;
Verschuere et al., 2011) showed an opposite result pattern. The
CIT is a widely used instrument that, similar to the aIAT, allows
to infer rather than detect deception. In the CIT, participants
are presented with crime-relevant and irrelevant information.
In particular, irrelevant information are presented with high
probability while crime-relevant trials have a low probability of
being presented (∼10%). Our results, suggest that the CIT and
the aIAT might engage different mechanisms. Indeed, in the
CIT the recognition of crime-relevant information produces an
increased LPC (or P300; Rosenfeld, 2011) while the incongruent
block of the aIAT produces a decreased LPC. The different
LPC patterns elicited by the aIAT and CIT might be ascribed
to the nature of these two paradigms: the CIT is based on an
oddball paradigm (Donchin and Coles, 1988) and thus reduces
the probability of crime-relevant stimuli compared to irrelevant
stimuli, while the aIAT uses the same proportion of stimuli
in the congruent and incongruent conditions. The difference
between these two instruments is further supported by a recent
study showing no correlation between the two of them (Hu and
Rosenfeld, 2012).
In a previous study from our group we showed that,
when the aIAT is used as an intention-detection technique
(i.e., to detect whether a specific prior intention is encoded
as true in an individual’s mind), the incongruent condition
was associated with a reduced LPC (Agosta et al., 2011).
Results reported here extend this result by showing that
an additional component—i.e., the N200—is elicited by the
incongruent condition when the aIAT is used to assess
autobiographical memories. Taken together, these results suggest
that the electrophysiological activations produced by the aIAT
might differ on basis of the phenomenon assessed by this
instrument.
Behavioral Results
Our study provided a further validation of the aIAT as amemory-
detection technique at the behavioral level (AUC= 0.93). Indeed,
the increase in reaction times in the incongruent condition of
the aIAT is also in agreement with previous studies investigating
deception suggesting that associating a true autobiographical
event with the concept of false and lying has a cognitive cost.
For example, Vrij and Mann (2001) found that the speech
of a convicted murder was slower when lying that telling the
truth. Similarly, studies investigating deception by means of RTs
paradigms showed deceitful responses produced longer latencies
in comparison with truthful responses (e.g., Spence et al., 2001,
2004; Carrión et al., 2010).
In addition to relevant results, the present study has also
some limitations. It is important to point out that, while our
data suggest a similarity in the cognitive processes associated
with deception and the incongruent condition of the aIAT, the
observation of similar electrophysiological brain activities is not
enough to unambiguously support such conclusion. Indeed, we
cannot conclusively exclude that additional cognitive processes
may be responsible for the electrophysiological responses
elicited by the aIAT in our study. A second limitation is that
the autobiographical memory investigated in our study was
emotionally neutral. Replication of our behavioral paradigm
with other more “emotional-laden” memories (e.g., by using
mock crime paradigm) or within more ecological settings will
be particularly useful to increase the confidence of our results.
Finally, although our results show that the aIAT can identify
whether an event is associated with the concept of true than false,
this does not necessary imply that the aIAT can detect whether an
event is objectively true. Indeed, the aIAT reflects what is stored
in an individual’s mind. That is, if an event is strongly believed
to be true and encoded as such in an individual’s mind then the
aIAT will identify it as a true event (Marini et al., 2012; Agosta
and Sartori, 2013).
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